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It is a warfare not between two social systems but between the social system called modern civilization and the fanatic disciples of an ignorant and destructive social dogma. The same ignorant fanaticism which led the Bolsheviks to think they could take possession of the earth through a world-revolution, emanating from an incredibly backward country, leads them now to believe they can publicly force the nations of the world to make concessions to their dogma and use this new prestige further to develop their power at home and abroad.

As Mr. Frank Vanderlip has just pointed out, "Lloyd George has attempted to force compatibility between two fundamentally incompatible systems," one of which is largely responsible for "the evils that have fallen on Russia"—though the chaotic and fantastic ukases that did so much to produce the Russian disorder hardly deserve the name of system. The American financier points out that "if Mr. Lloyd George, like Lincoln, saw that Europe cannot be divided between two systems—like America at the time of the Civil War—Genoa would not have been convened." At least the Soviets would not have been invited.

Mr. Vanderlip points also to the only conceivable solution—though, again, his language is not quite accurate. He says: "Russia should have complete freedom to retain and experiment with her social order, but so long as it is communistic it must be isolated." It is not Russia which is doing the experimenting but a relatively small band of fanatics; it is not Communism which must be isolated, but this fanatical band. But the principle is sound: non-intervention and isolation as long as the Bolshevik régime continues.

There can be no rehabilitation if Europe gives a new lease of power to the most destructive régime since the days of Genghis Khan. Democratic civilization is even more fundamentally and squarely challenged by Bolshevism than it ever was by Prussianism. Ex-President Wilson had the support not only of labor but of the entire public opinion of the world when he declared during the World War that America would refuse to deal with the Kaiser and would consent to deal only with the people. That principle is even more vital to world civilization and progress, in dealing with the Russian problem.

The World's Need of International Citizenship

By ANNOT ROBINSON

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IN Europe, and perhaps as definitely in Great Britain as in any other of the countries of Europe, we have had a very hard experience since the Armistice was signed in 1918. Because of that experience abstractions in politics are not, it seems to me, of quite the same interest in Great Britain as they are in

America. We are not at the moment so interested in the question of revenge, in the questions of ethics or in the questions of moral values, in which, judging from your newspapers, your politics are involved at the present time. We have had, following upon the Armistice, a very prolonged period

of unemployment which has assumed very large proportions. We had, when I left Britain in April, very nearly 2,000,000 of our skilled workers entered on the Labor Exchange lists as looking for work and unable to find it.

If you take the family unit in Great Britain at its average of five persons, just under 25 per cent of our population is at the present moment living on unemployment insurance, on relief from the guardians and on any savings that may be left from the period of war prosperity and the boom that followed for a short time after the signing of the Armistice.

To have, as we have, an industrial population, that is dependent largely on export trade, in the position that I have just indicated means very hard and very real thinking. It is impossible in our country just now to separate politics from economics or economics from politics. What has been said at Genoa by the representatives of Great Britain as to the necessity of forgetting these abstractions that apparently still exercise the minds of politicians, and getting down to the real position of the great mass of the common people of Europe, represents very largely the average opinion in Great Britain.

ENGLISH LABOR NO DESIRE FOR REVENGE

The great mass of our workers are not in any way desirous of revenge on any of the late Allies. They are not desirous of taking part in military expeditions into Russia. It is true that the after-war experiences of our industrial country has led to a realization that we had not had before—a realization not only of the inter-dependence of trade, of the inter-dependence of commerce and of the inter-dependence of finance, but also of the inter-dependence of the prosperity and the standard of living of

the great mass of the workers in Europe. Because of this new comprehension of our inter-dependence, of our close articulation, and of our close relationship to each other, when it was proposed in 1920 that our government should again help to finance another filibustering expedition into Russia, the mass of organized labor in Great Britain protested. They protested in the following fashion. As soon as it became evident in 1920 that preparations were being made by Great Britain to take part in the expedition, the very large trade unions immediately took action. I think the trade Unions in Great Britain are a much stronger and a much more integral part of our social and political life than they are here. The mass of our workers belong to trade unions. Our trade unions are very large bodies, and they have a very considerable social and political power. They have a direct representation in the British House of Commons. Numerically, the representation is small, but politically and economically, their power is very great.

As soon, then, as this military expedition was under consideration the great trade unions and the political labor party immediately set up, in London and in every one of our large provincial towns bodies that were known as Councils of Action. The Council of Action represented the labor political party, the trade unions and a large part of liberal and progressive thought. These Councils of Action in each of the towns and in London immediately organized deputations and authorized the sending of telegrams, the sending of letters and publicity in every one of our great cities. A huge demonstration was organized in Manchester. I should say that this demonstration, the largest one—there were many minor ones in the outskirts of the city—must have

been attended by probably between one-sixth and one-fifth of all the inhabitants of the city. Similar experiences were found in Glasgow, in Leeds, in Bristol and in every one of our centers of industry. Those demonstrations unanimously said that we would not stand behind our government if a further military expedition were sent into Russia. There was complete unanimity: so great was the unanimity that the idea of sending further military expeditions into Russia was immediately dropped, and the policy that Mr. Lloyd George is trying to carry through at Genoa at the present time in demanding a recognition of the Russian government and the resumption of trade with Russia, has been very largely the policy of our country since that action was taken by the trade unions in the autumn of 1920.

ECONOMIC INTER-DEPENDENCE

I wish to leave the very clear impression that the great mass of the voters in Great Britain at the present time do not desire revenge. They know that war came in 1914 as a result of many causes; that it was, indeed, a tangled skein that led to that sudden declaration of war and the involving of Great Britain in that war. Our workers know that since the War, and particularly since the signing of the peace in May, 1919, the standard of living of the great mass of our workers has been very seriously reduced, and is being still further reduced. The existence in Germany of those coal miners that are producing the 2,000,000 tons of the reparation coal sent into France every month, free of charge, and the depositing of that coal in France, has meant the under-selling of British coal in all the markets of Europe. Our workers realize that just as the German miners are in a certain

sense slave workers for Europe, working for a wage that means underfeeding, that means inferior clothing, that means continued mental distress, that means suffering to their families, so the existence of that slave labor in the mines of Germany has reduced not only the volume of trade but the standard of wages in Great Britain and at the present time is doing the same thing for many of the miners in France. For it is not only in Great Britain that the existence of this slave labor in Germany, in the name of reparations, has reduced the wages of the miners and the standard of living, and caused unemployment but it is true also in France to an increasing degree.

To our workers, therefore, the whole result of the War so far has been a worsening of the position of the mass of the workers, a depreciation of trade, a lowering—a matter of greater importance to the informed labor opinion of the country than perhaps we realize—a lowering of moral values, a coarsening, a very serious coarsening, of our social life, and an increase of crimes of violence. Our workers, recognizing that, feel that what our politics in Great Britain should be striving for at the present time is reconciliation, resumption of trade and a basis of understanding among the mass of the peoples of Europe that will make the sudden declaration of a great war an impossible event in the future.

I ought to say that I believe—and in this, perhaps, the men of Great Britain would not agree with me—I believe that the enfranchisement of women, and the great increase of women members of our trade unions, has something to do with the moral recoil that undoubtedly is manifesting itself in the mass of the workers against war, militarism and its implications.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF TRADE

Now as to what has happened to our trades: I am going to take the cotton trade, because, obviously, that is a trade that will be of interest to American readers. In Lancashire, as you know, we have a teeming population employed in the cotton industry. My home is in Manchester. Within twenty miles of the heart of Manchester we have actually a larger population than within twenty miles of the heart of London. We have a great number of large towns thickly populated, and the prosperity of those towns depends on the cotton trade. We get our raw cotton partly from America, partly from Egypt and partly from other places. This cotton is spun into yarn, woven into cloth, and made up into garments. The greater part of the results of this cotton industry is designed for the export trade. It is not realized how important the markets of Central Europe were to this industry. Oldham and Bolton are two large spinning towns. Bolton is largely a spinning town and Oldham is almost exclusively a spinning town. Forty per cent of the cotton yarn spun in these towns used to be exported to Germany. A fairly large percentage used to be sent to Austria and to Central Europe.

Today Germany wants to buy that cotton yarn even more eagerly than she bought it in 1914. Austria wants it very badly. I visited Vienna this last summer and in the first-class hotels in Vienna there was a famine in such humble things as towels and table napkins. I was also told that in the homes of the people there was a tremendous shortage of necessary underclothing for the children, and that the women were suffering greatly from the same shortage. And, to a certain extent, this is also true in Germany.

Great Britain is like a shop-keeper in a neighborhood where all his customers have become paupers. The Germans can not afford to buy our cotton yarn, not because they do not want to buy it, not because we do not want to sell it, but because, owing to the depreciation of the value of German money, following on the reparations treaty and the continued uncertainty of the political and economic relations of Europe, they cannot afford to pay the price that we must obtain, with the result that almost 60 per cent of our spinners are unemployed.

A large proportion of our industrial class are working perhaps one week out of three, and this is not confined to spinners. Take our next process, weaving. We weave very large quantities of thin cotton cloth of various kinds for export to China. The China trade was a trade of very great importance, indeed, to Manchester shippers, and Manchester shippers were a very important part of the industrial fabric life of Manchester. China's customer for many of her goods was Russia. She sold very large quantities of tea, and very large quantities of silk to Russia. But the Russian market is closed and China has no output for these goods on her northern and western frontiers. What is the result? The result is that China has neither the money nor the credits to buy great quantities of cotton cloth. The weavers then, are in as bad a position as the spinners, and our shippers and our warehousemen are in as unfortunate a position as are both the spinners and the weavers.

It is not only, of course, the China trade that is closed to us, but in many parts of the Levant and in the Near East, our markets, owing to the disturbed state of the various countries, are unable to absorb the usual products, and the Indian situation complicates

and makes even more difficult the position of the cotton trade in Manchester. We feel in Great Britain, in our relations with the other powers in Europe, as if the one crying need of the day was a realization of fundamental facts. Today not only do we have international art and international drama and international music, but we also have international finance, international trade, and international industry. So closely articulated and so closely interwoven are these things that a dislocation such as has followed on the great European war and on that very ill-conceived peace treaty, and such as has followed on the boycott of Russia, makes it clear that without peace and without reconciliation there is no very happy prospect in front of the great mass of the inhabitants of Europe.

OPENING THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER

We feel—and in this I am, perhaps, touching on difficult ground—we feel that probably a good deal of moral indignation has been wasted on what has gone on in Russia. We feel that probably the affairs of Russia, the inside economy of Russia, the form of government that the majority of the Russians apparently chose, is a matter of more concern to Russia than it is to outsiders.

When I came over in the *Cedric* some time ago to America, we were held up overnight within the three mile limit, and immediately all those good Britishers who wished to buy a drink on board a British ship were unable to do so because of your prohibition laws in America. We might have just as well said, I think, we Britishers on board the *Cedric*, "This is a tremendous interference with personal liberty, and we don't like the American government because of it,"

as utter the criticism of Russia with which we have become familiar.

Much that is happening in Russia is on all four's with the point I am trying to make about prohibition. You may not like it; I may not like it; the people in Great Britain may not like it, but what goes on in Russia and the form of government that Russia desires to have is no more the affair of Great Britain than it is of America. When you chose to set up a Republic, it grieved us, but you made your own choice, and so have the Russians. We feel in Great Britain very very keenly that probably if we are ever going to have what we hope to have, a peaceful and a reconciled Europe, if we are not going to have so many people living on the verge of starvation, if we are not going to have a repetition of that horror in the Balkan region, if we are never going to have these things again—we must somehow or other open the frontiers of Russia and obtain the raw materials she has in such abundance and the markets she is willing to offer. If we did that, we might probably take a very great step forward to what is absolutely essential in Europe if our political relations are going to be successful, and that is, the reduction of the inflamed spirit of nationality and the realization among the great mass of the inhabitants of Europe that although you are a good Frenchman, or a good Britisher, or a good Spaniard, or a good German, that that is not enough; that in a world of international art, of international literature, of international finance, inflamed nationality is impossible, and that probably what is the matter with Europe today is the clashing of the two ideals of national and international citizenship. Nationality must flow beyond frontiers, and must extend, so that citizenship, as well as trade and industry and commerce, goes

beyond the outer boundaries of one's own country and become continental and inter-continental.

I think that in Great Britain, partly, as I said, through the knowledge of the coarsening effect of the War, partly through this prolonged period of unemployment, partly because of the realization of the awful sufferings in central and eastern Europe, we are having a very sound, compulsory education in an international outlook. We feel probably

that in the years that lie ahead of us we in Great Britain will never again be quite so closed in within our little island but be able in a more liberal spirit to realize that we cannot have those clashing ideals; that a narrow nationality and twentieth century realities have to be reconciled, and the only possibility of reconciliation lies in burying all those abstract ideas about justice and revenge and reparations and beginning again in a new spirit and with a new ideal.

The New International Spirit and the Failure of Nationalism

By M^{LLE}. THERESE POTTECHER-ARNOULD

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IT seems to me that, as Norman Angel has so well pointed out, the chief cause of the War rested on the action which nations, because of an expanding population and increasing industry, were forced to take in order to insure the best conditions possible for their people. They were pushed to territorial expansions and an exercise of political and military force against each other.

We have considered nations as rival units but it seems from the results of the War and the recent consequences also of the peace treaty that a great economic law has been ignored; which is, that the politics of nations being closely interwoven with economics, the economics of nations are closely interdependent.

Now during the War we put in common our men, our goods, our food and the means of transportation. Just after the Armistice, instead of keeping those organizations, instead of pooling what

was left of our resources—not only with our former allies but with our former enemies, and even the neutral countries as well—instead of uniting our efforts on both sides in order to get the confidence on which credit depends, instead of utilizing the labor of demobilized men to start reconstruction work at once, we returned to the old traditions of an obsolete nationalism. We opposed to the sensible conception of coöperation, the notion of each one scrambling for himself; we returned to the medieval notions of booty, of spoils, and we began to deprive Germany of her means of producing by taking the coal mines of the Saar and also by not lifting the blockade for nearly sixteen months, or, perhaps longer. Yet, the liabilities of France rested on the ability of Germany to work for the restoration of the invaded North of France.

Then, too, what about the Balkanization of Central Europe? There are districts which are industrial and dis-